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IDEALIZED *ΣΧΟΛΗ* AND DISDAIN FOR WORK: ASPECTS OF PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS IN ANCIENT DEMOCRACY

σχολῆς πρῶτον δεῖν (Xen. *Cyr.* 8.1.13)

If the forerunners of the literature on leisure are held to have been Greeks,[1] this is largely because the Greeks idealized σχολή as a state of existential well-being, thanks to which the free citizen was supposed to elevate his virtue to the utmost. A small number of passages, mainly in Plato's *Theaetetus* and Aristotle's *Politics*, offer firm criteria by which to define this philosophical stance and to uncover a lifestyle that seems to have been typical of at least a segment of ancient Greek society. In the idealization by Greek writers of σχολή, there lies the vital clue for an understanding of the Greeks' attitude towards work, because, if σχολή is understood as 'leisure', then (all the more as modern leisure studies develop) it is bound up with work; or, rather, it can be understood only in contradistinction to work.

However, a study of work in ancient Greece does not always seem to support modern scholars who maintain that the ancient Greek writers idealized σχολή as a result of their disdain for work, or at least that the views of such writers had a significant impact on Greek society. Besides, the concept of leisure itself has proved to be no more solid for the moderns than it was indefinite for the Greeks. As far as idealization of σχολή is concerned, when Gustave Glotz in his seminal monograph on work in ancient Greece broached the subject of the disdainful attitude towards it, he rightly avoided misleading generalizations and overstatement.[2] In Glotz's opinion, by and large, the Athenians took a favourable view of work, and theories which disparaged it were confined to small groups of intellectuals, although individual self-interest or plain snobbery might have encouraged their wider dissemination. Of course, according to Glotz, these same ideas are connected with the way social inequalities were reflected in the hierarchy of occupations and, ultimately, with the fact that political participation under the democratic system conflicted with the citizens' engagement in productive work.[3] More than six decades later, Maurice Balme went further when he established that the vast majority of Athenians embraced an almost

[1] See, mainly, S. de Grazia, *Of Time, Work and Leisure* (New York, 1962), 3ff.

[2] See e.g. C. Mossé, *Le travail en Grèce et à Rome* (Paris, 1966), 5: 'Le travail leur apparaissait comme une condemnation à laquelle nulle valeur rédemptrice n'était attachée . . . l'oisiveté n'était pas un vice, mais un idéal auquel aspirait l'honnête homme et que prônait le sage' (cf. 44, 50; cf., however, 46ff.); C. Bradford Welles, 'Hesiod's attitude toward labor', *GRBS* 8 (1967), 22: 'to normal Greeks, the drudgery of farm work was anathema' (cf. 9); M. Austin and P. Vidal-Naquet, *Économie et société en Grèce ancienne* (Paris, 1972), 29–30. Similarly, even more than wealth itself, leisure is frequently identified with the paramount ideal which characterized a class-determined, distinctive lifestyle (see S. Johnstone, 'Virtuous toil, vicious work: Xenophon on aristocratic style', *CPh* 89 [1994], 222), but even the exclusion of women from work is regarded as being due to the quest for a status symbol in their idleness (see L. S. Sussman, 'Workers and drones; labor, idleness and gender definition in Hesiod's beehive', *Arethusa* 11 [1978], 36–7).

[3] G. Glotz, *Le Travail dans la Grèce ancienne* (Paris, 1920), 193–202; cf. 208. P. Louis had been equally cautious eight years earlier in his monograph *Le Travail dans le monde romain* (Paris, 1912), 8–9, 18–20, merely linking abstention from paid work (in contrast to farming) with the gathering of the proletariat in the capital, the free distributions, and, of course, the growing number of slaves.

puritanical work ethic: both the views of small groups of intellectuals regarding the distortive effects of mechanical labour and their grousing about the supposed incompatibility of manual work and participation in the political processes paled into insignificance beside this long, firm tradition, which went back to Homer and his admiration for craftsmen, and recognized virtue in work and the necessity appropriate to it.[4]

On the other hand, the very concept of leisure, as understood in modern times an as applied to the ancient Greek sources, seems to waver between two similar, though not identical, formulations. In the first case, from Thorstein Veblen's classic analysis of 'conspicuous leisure' onwards, 'abstention from labour' is an indication of economic superiority and social prestige, which—in the view of the ancient Greeks, inherited from the 'predatory phase' of civilization—stands in contrast to work, which is indicative of inferiority and subordination to a master.[5] In the second case, 'leisure' is identified with a state of liberation from the necessity of working, and indeed from any undesirable activity, a state which is differentiated from spare time and in itself constitutes an ideal state of existence, a concept closer in spirit to the idealization of leisure formulated by the Greeks,[6] Modern scholars have added further characteristics to this state of existence, such as the 'pleasure' derived from 'a sense of choice and desire', as also certain socially defined and distributed preferential criteria.[7]

Furthermore, the extensive and exhaustive investigation of the subject of σχολή has created the impression that it was a semantically consolidated, definitively and precisely formulated concept. This impression has thus led to the view that such a concept represented the sum total of ancient aristocratic ideas on leisure and was also more or less understood by the average person. But not every facet of this aspect of the question has been clarified either. Thus, for instance, the significance of Aristotelian

[4] M. Balme, 'Attitudes to work and leisure in ancient Greece', *G&R* 31 (1984), 140–52. Cf. G. Nenci's aphorism, 'il faut éviter d'examiner le travail en Grèce en prenant comme point de départ Platon ou Aristote', in 'Chômeurs (ἀγοραῖοι) et manoeuvres (χειρώνακτες) dans la Grèce classique', *DHA* 7 (1981), 338, which he bases on the fact that, echoing an aristocratic ideal, they rejected the governance of the state as a form of work and presented involvement in politics as exclusively reserved for the intellectuals, whose role they had elevated considerably; cf. C. Meier, 'Arbeit, Politik, Identität. Neue Fragen im alten Athen?', in V. Schubert (ed.), *Der Mensch und seine Arbeit* (Sankt Ottilien, 1986), 108. For a survey of the views regarding the disparaging (or favourable) attitude to work, see R. Descat, *L'Acte et l'effort. Une idéologie du travail en Grèce ancienne (8ème–5ème siècle av. J.-C.)* (Besançon, 1986), 13–18; cf. C. Sylvester, 'The classical idea of leisure: cultural ideal or class prejudice?', *Leisure Sciences* 21 (1999), 3–16.

[5] T. Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class* (New York, 1934 [1899[1], 1918[2]]), 35ff.

[6] de Grazia (n. 1), 8, 14–15. For Aristotelian σχολή, comparing it with contemporary theoretical approaches to leisure, cf. C. B. Gray, 'Paideia, schole and paidia: then and now', paper read on 10 August 1998 during the 20th World Congress of Philosophy (Boston, MA) (electronically published, http://web.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/OApp/OAppGray.htm).

[7] J. P. Toner, *Leisure and Ancient Rome* (Cambridge, 1995), 11, 17. For a 'définition fonctionelle' of leisure, cf. L. Giangrande, 'Le loisir à Rome', *Society and Leisure* 3 (1974), 37–8 ('libération des fatigues physiques . . . de l'ennui quotidien . . . du pouvoir créateur'). More generally, the view of leisure as an independent, albeit exceptionally diverse, aspect of human activity is empirically based on the premise of choice and desire, though equally on the exclusion of any kind of 'professional' occupation or family or personal obligation, which are tacitly—and arbitrarily—perceived as by definition 'undesirable'. Thus, classic monographs on everyday life include in the category of leisure festivals, excursions into the countryside, reading and writing, music, keeping pets, cockfighting, dancing and drinking, physical exercise and sport—in short, anything that combats boredom in young people and fills the empty hours of the elderly after retirement, such as growing cabbages, for instance (see e.g. J. P. V. D. Balsdon, *Life and Leisure in Ancient Rome* [London, 1969], 144–72).

σχολή is rightly distinguished (as in Friedrich Solmsen's study[8]) from the more elementary sense of 'to have time for something'; but the close connection between these two senses has been generally underestimated by modern scholars. More importantly, the fact is dodged that the 'supremely' Aristotelian (and equally the Platonic)[9] σχολή co-exists, as Eino Mikkola has so clearly shown,[10] alongside a wide range of semantic nuances of the same word, most of which, of course, simply reflect a related, though not synonymous, current usage.

Many of the questions relating to the interpretation of σχολή are simply due to the fact that a modern retrospective semantic interpretation has automatically been applied to the word. The earlier uses of the term, in Pindar for instance, suggest a more elementary meaning than 'leisure'. For instance, if we opt for 'leisure' in the eighth Pythian ode, then the conceptual relationship between the statement εἰμὶ δ' ἄσχολος and the subordinate clause μὴ κόρος ἐλθὼν κνίσῃ becomes unacceptably loose (29–32: 'I have no *leisure* . . . so that no satiety would come and distress us', instead of 'I have [to dispose of] no *time* . . .'). Furthermore, the same interpretation shows that sometimes Pindar's application to his art (in a list) demands 'leisure' (σχολή: *Nem.* 10.46; cf. *Pyth.* 8.29), but in other circumstances (his composing of the paean to the Ceans) it is his simply 'non-leisure' (ἀσχολία), which is interrupted, so that he can compose another ode (*Isthm.* 1.2). But in fact, in all cases, Pindar appears merely to be referring to the temporal context either of a performance of his poetry or of his personal commitments; that is, the poet 'has not got time' to expatiate into perorations (*Nem.* 10 and *Pyth.* 8) or he regards his duty towards Thebes as more imperative than the 'lack of time'[11] due to his commitments (*Isthm.* 1).[12] In other words, although its etymological relationship with the verb ἔχειν is obscure, σχολή may be understood as equivalent to 'possession',[13] in this case 'of time', that is a situation which it would be difficult, if not inappropriate, to convey with a Greek periphrasis along the lines of χρόνον ἔχειν.[14] Furthermore, this interpretation of σχολή differs scarcely at all from

[8] F. Solmsen, 'Leisure and play in Aristotle's ideal state', *RhM* 107 (1964), 196–7, n. 19.

[9] J. F. O'Leary, 'Skole and Plato's work ethic', *Journal of Leisure Research* 5 (1973), 49–55, observes that 'Plato described leisure as instrumental and subordinate to the necessity and pleasure of work' or 'leisure is a condition of work'; however, this modern reading of Plato's attitude falls short in its interpretation of the specific passages concerned, most notably *Resp.* 370b and 619c, and, regrettably, takes little account of earlier alternative readings.

[10] E. Mikkola, '*Schole* bei Aristoteles', *Arctos* n.s. 2 (1958), 69ff.

[11] Socrates seems to be interpreting the passage in Pindar in this way in Plato's *Phaedrus* (227b: ἀκούειν . . . 'καὶ ἀσχολίας ὑπέρτερον' πρᾶγμα).

[12] In A. M. Miller's analysis of 'digressive leisure' ('*N.* 4.33–43 and the defense of digressive leisure', *CJ* 78 [1983], 202–20), the antithesis between σχολή and ἀσχολία, in the sense of 'leisure' and its opposite, is presented as telling and natural. However, the substance of the antithesis—using the same terms—is conveyed exclusively by Plato (*Tht.* 172c–177b). Consequently, rather than 'digressive leisure', one would seem to be on firmer ground discussing the poetic 'method of digressive indirection' (Miller, 215).

[13] L. Meyer (*Handbuch der griechischen Etymologie* 4 [Leipzig, 1902], s.v., 201) regarded its provenance from ἔχειν as incontestable—as, indeed, did E. R. Wharton before him—and concluded, on the basis of Homeric meanings of ἔχειν, that the original meaning of σχολή was 'das Sichenthalten, Ablassen, Ausruhen'. Mikkola (n. 10), 86, rejects its provenance from a negative sense, such as 'refrain' or 'abstain'; while P. Chantraine (*DÉLG* [Paris, 1968], s.v., 1083) expresses reservations about the morphological substantiation of this interpretation.

[14] The periphrasis is usually found with connotations of 'duration': see Aesch. fr. 352.1 Radt; Hippoc. *Genit.* 30.19; *Off.* 15.9; Pl. *Phlb.* 38e; 60e; Arist. *Metaph.* 1053a9; *[Pr.]* 890b33; Theophr. *Caus. Pl.* 1.14.4; *Hist. Pl.* 1.2.2; 9.14.1 (in pl.); Epicurus *Sent. Vat.* fr. 4.2. However, in Ephorus the periphrasis σχολὴν καὶ χρόνον ἔχειν is found once; but it is in fact his epitome in Diodorus (12.39.3 = *FGrH* 70 F 196.3).

the corresponding 'time (or spare time) to do something' or 'time with nothing (else) to do', with which, as regards the common use of the term, scholars are anyway perfectly familiar.[15]

Of course, if we adopt this more elementary interpretation, our attention necessarily shifts from the abstract significance of σχολή to the various aspects of its use: first of all its positive or negative connotations; then its contradistinction to its antonym, ἀσχολία; and finally its points of convergence with, or divergence from, associated concepts. Furthermore, however, an investigation of these aspects necessitates that we augment and cross-reference our material with the various uses of the group of derivatives of σχολή, something that scholars have not always bothered to do. As regards the first point, then, it has been suggested that the earliest appearances of σχολή, thanks to the positive connotations of 'leisure',[16] reflect the painful sense of the loss of time as a commodity, 'in dem historischen Moment in dem Chronos zu herrschen beginnt', and of the lack of freedom which this loss entails.[17] However, there are equally strong indications of a perception, or an empirical inference, that time is of its very nature meant for action and that its 'possession'—and much more a perverse situation which tends towards the nullity of ἀσχολία—constitutes an impediment towards fulfilling its purpose for human beings. Herein, probably, lies the negative signification of σχολή which is found for the first time in Aeschylus, when σχολή tinges the malaise of the phrase οὗτοι θυραία τῇδ' ἐμοὶ σχολὴ πάρα τρίβειν (*Ag.* 1055), conveys the bitter self-mockery of the chained Prometheus (818: σχολὴ δὲ πλείων ἢ θέλω πάρεστί μοι),[18] or characterizes the winds of the Strymon, which, delaying the Argives' departure, make the empty time a cause of all troubles (*Ag.* 193: πνοαὶ . . . κακόσχολοι, . . . παλιμμήκη χρόνον τιθεῖσαι). More sharply, anyone who postpones action is sternly warned: εἴ τι δράσεις τῶνδε, μὴ σχολὴν τίθει (*Ag.* 1059); and

[15] de Grazia (n. 1), 3, 12; cf. Meier (n. 4), 51, who cites Kant's definition 'leere Zeit'. In this sense, see the common periphrasis σχολὴν ἄγειν: Hdt. 3.134; Thuc. 5.29; Eur. *Med.* 1238; Eur. fr. 835.4; Isoc. 5.87 (cf. *Ep.* 9.14), 15.39; Xen. *Cyr.* 5.5.39 (ὅσον χρόνον σχολὴν . . . ἦγεν); 8.1.15, 3.47; Pl. *Ap.* 36d; *La.* 181e; *Leg.* 832d, 855d; *Resp.* 374c, 376d; *Tht.* 154e, 172c; *Ti.* 18b; Dem. 8.36, 24.158; Alexis fr. 28.3; Duris *FGrH* 76 F 53.4; Men. *Dysc.* 357 (τρυφῶντά τε; cf. fr. 405–6.3 *CAF*); *Epit.* 1084; *Sam.* 20; also, the periphrases with the verbs εἶναι (often omitted, sometimes—mainly in Xenophon—with the infinitive: Soph. *Aj.* 816; Eur. *IT* 1220; Ar. *Ach.* 407–9 *bis*; *Nub.* 221; *Thesm.* 377; *Plut.* 281–2; Xen. *An.* 1.6.9, 4.1.17, 5.1.9; *Cyr.* 1.6.17, 2.1.16, 4.3.12 *bis*, 5.1.8, 3.6, 7.1.18, 5.50; *Mem.* 1.6.9; Pl. *La.* 187a; *[Hp. Ma.]* 281a; *[Just.]* 374b *bis*; *Leg.* 961b; *Phdr.* 229e; *Prt.* 314d *bis*; *Resp.* 406c–d *bis*, 500b; *Ti.* 89c; Ctesias *FGrH* 688 F 26.73; Men. *Dysc.* 196, 880), ἔχειν (Eur. *Andr.* 732; Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.7: ἡσυχίαν καὶ σχολήν; *Cyr.* 7.5.42, 5.52; Pl. *Leg.* 813c), and also γίγνεσθαι (rarely with the infinitive: Strattis fr. 51.1; Xen. *Cyr.* 8.1.14; *Hiero* 1.1; Pl. *Phd.* 66d) or ποιεῖσθαι (sometimes with the infinitive: Xen. *Mem.* 2.6.4; Pl. *Ion* 530d). The ἀσχολίαν ἄγειν periphrases are formed commensurately (Pl. *Ap.* 39e; *Phd.* 66d; Dem. 41.17), as also γίγνεσθαι (Pl. *Grg.* 458c; *[Sis.]* 387b; cf. n. 19) or εἶναι (sometimes omitted, sometimes with the infinitive: Antiphon 6.12; Thuc. 1.90; Xen. *Lac.* 13.1; *Mem.* 3.9.9; Pl. *Phd.* 58d; *Prt.* 335c), in a sense very close to 'to have something [else] to do . . .'; the adverb ἀσχόλως + ἔχειν is also found once ([Dem.] 33.25). For the sense of devoting time exclusively to a specific activity, see Isoc. 6.76: σχολὴν ἄγειν καὶ μηδὲ περὶ ἓν ἄλλο διατρίβειν. Cf. nn. 28, 49.

[16] The positive connotations of the word are defended by, among others, O. Skutsch, 'Der Ennianische Soldatenchor', *RhM* 96 (1953), 199–200, J.-M. André, *Recherches sur l'otium romain* (Paris, 1962), 12 (cf. 14), and N. Loraux, 'PONOS. Sur quelques difficultés de la peine comme nom du travail', *AION* (archeol.) 4 (1982), 176. More cautious, Solmsen (n. 8), 204, gives no definite answer as to whether σχολή 'in itself had connotations incompatible with the idea of passing to less valuable occupations'.

[17] E. C. Welskopf, *Probleme der Musse im alten Hellas* (Berlin, 1962), 16–17.

[18] For the temporal connotations of the expression, cf., conversely, Eur. *Andr.* 732 (οὐ γὰρ ἄφθονον σχολὴν ἔχω).

precisely this 'possession' of time is conveyed by the denominative σχολάζω, which Aeschylus uses in order to augment the group of derivatives of σχολή, always in various forms of the negative imperative: μή νυν σχόλαζε, μηδέ τις σχολαζέτω (*Supp.* 209 and 883).[19] Similarly, the nub of the negative overtones of σχολή is very clearly apparent in the group of derivatives of the rare adjective σχολαῖος, mainly in the adverbial forms σχολαίτερον or σχολαίτατα, which are invariably contra-distinguished from the concept of speed (sometimes undesirable, but always more efficient in terms of filling time), and also preparedness.[20] The same applies to the adverbial use of the dative σχολῇ, of which the sense of 'tardily' evolved into the equivalent of 'not at all' or 'never'.[21]

Furthermore, the management of σχολή also seems to have been the object of a deontological—that is, moralistic—treatment, of which Sophocles' imperative τίκτει γὰρ οὐδὲν ἐσθλὸν εἰκαία σχολή remains a unique testimony for the period (fr. 308 Radt). In the context of a restrictive relationship—which seems preferable to a descriptive non-restrictive relationship—between the adjective and the substantive,[22] Sophocles formulates the idea of a purpose, by means of which the 'possession of time' at a point of departure, if it is not to prove in vain, has to be transformed into activity (that is, 'no good comes with time of no purpose', instead of 'no good comes with purposeless leisure'). In this sense, ἀσχολία justifiably attracts positive, or at least neutral, connotations: time is sometimes employed in an undesirable or intolerable way, but this is not necessarily unnatural or surprising, as the Athenians very well realize when they regard complaining about any kind of ἀσχολίαν ἐπίπονον as futile (Thuc. 1.70); as also does Xenophon, when he extols the benefits of farming (*Hiero* 9.8: καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη πολὺ μᾶλλον σὺν τῇ ἀσχολίᾳ συμπαρομαρτεῖ). Of course, as in the last quotation, so in the employment and use of time—the 'purpose' which Sophocles would demand for σχολή—one detects the concept of work and, consequently, may define ἀσχολία as litotes (that is, 'state of no time', rendering the meaning of 'state of employment').[23] This in turn means that behind the name of every act, every ἔργον, there is a form of ἀσχολία, into which σχολή has been transformed.

[19] More generally, in a neutral sense, see Ar. fr. 107.2; in the sense of cessation (σχολάζω [ἀπό] . . .): Xen. *Cyr.* 7.5.52; *Hell.* 7.4.28; Arist. *Pol.* 1270a4; Duris *FGrH* 76 F 13.34. Cf. the substantive σχολή with semantic overtones of a disturbing slowness, Soph. *Aj.* 194 (but also of cessation: *OT* 1286); also, the periphrasis σχολὴ γίγνεσθαι, i.e. 'delay', Thuc. 5.10.

[20] σχολαῖος: Soph. fr. 966.2 Radt (VS. ἐντείνων); Thuc. 3.29; Xen. *An.* 4.1.13; σχολαιότης: Thuc. 2.18; σχολαίως: Xen. *An.* 1.5.8; Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1171b25 (VS. προθύμως); *Part. An.* 691b21; σχολαί(ό)τερον, -τατα: Thuc. 1.84, 2.75, 4.47, 7.15, 81; Xen. *An.* 1.5.9 (VS. θᾶττον); *Hell.* 6.3.6 (VS. τάχιστα); *Lac.* 11.3 (VS. τάχιστα); Pl. *Resp.* 610d (VS. θᾶττον); *Tht.* 206d (VS. θᾶττον); [Arist.] *Mu.* 399a4 (VS. θᾶττον); Dem. 21.221 (VS. θᾶττον). For the Hippocratic Corpus, see *Flat.* 7 (VS. θᾶσσον); *Morb.* 1.20 (VS. παραχρῆμα); 21; *Aff.* 52 (VS. ταχύ); *Morb. Sacr.* 6. Cf. comparative forms of the adjective: Hdt. 9.6; Hippoc. *Morb.* 3.15 (cf. *Dieb. Judic.* 10) (VS. θάσσους).

[21] Soph. *Ant.* 231 (σχολῇ ταχύς = an oxymoron?); 390; *OT* 434; Eur. fr. 317.3; Thuc. 1.142, 3.46 (VS. ταχύ); 78, 8.95; Andoc. 1.90, 102, 2.19; Xen. *An.* 3.4.27, 4.1.16; *Cyr.* 2.4.6, 4.2.6, 8.4.9; *Mem.* 3.14.3, 4.2.24, 4.25; Pl. *La.* 190a; *Leg.* 668c *bis*, 686b; *Ly.* 214d; *Phd.* 65b, 106d; *Plt.* 295b; *Prt.* 330d; *Resp.* 354c, 388d, 395a, 610e *bis*; *Soph.* 233b *bis*, 241e, 261b; Arist. *Eth. Eud.* 1218a1; *Metaph.* 999a10, 1001a23; *Pol.* 1325b28; *Rh.* 1397b13; *[Xen.]* 980b16; Theopomp. *FGrH* 115 F 80.22: σχολῇ καὶ πράως; Theophr. fr. 154.1 (VS. ταχέως); Chaeremon fr. 20.1 Snell: σχολῇ βαδίζων ὁ χρόνος; Alexis fr. 135.4: ἀτρέμα τε καὶ σχολῇ; fr. 246.1 *bis* (VS. ταχύ); Men. *Georg.* fr. 6 Sandbach, fr. 436.2.

[22] Cf. Skutsch (n. 16), ibid.: 'εἰκαία . . . kein schmückendes, sondern ein definierendes Beiwort ist'.

[23] Cf. André (n. 16), 8, 15.

Yet they are not synonymous. On the contrary, a number of examples prove that the generic and abstract connotations of ἀσχολία may cover such disparate 'activities' as the gratification of physical pleasures (Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.16 and *Mem.* 1.3.11) and also any πόνος involved in restraining them[24] (Xen. *Lac.* 3.3).[25] This is probably why the use of the term—as also of ἄσχολος[26]—seems to be inappropriate for individuals whose lot is exclusively associated with manual labour, such as slaves or those performing a mere mechanical art.[27] By contrast, avoiding the negatively charged representations associated with dependence on work, ἀσχολία could easily represent a number of activities for which free citizens and, of course, the upper social strata especially, manifested their preference.

At all events, people's time is made up of constant transitions from σχολή to ἀσχολία, that is from 'possession' of it to 'lack' of it,[28] and these transitions are determined by the alternation or succession of the things with which each person occupies himself. We thus have to wonder whether there is really such a sharp, clear distinction between σχολή and ἀσχολία as to justify a strong aversion to work. In actual fact, just as with all human activities,[29] work implicitly presupposes σχολή: thus, pseudo-Iamblichus uses the expression ἄσχολοι . . . πρὸς τὰ ἔργα γίγνονται with reference to those people who, in a state of lawlessness 'do not have time' to work (7.8). The fact that Aristotle repeats almost exactly the same expression with reference not to those who abstain from work but to the inhabitants of the countryside who 'are busy' with their agricultural labours reveals a shift in the meaning of the word to that of

[24] For the connotations of the concept in such contexts, see Johnstone (n. 2), 220ff.

[25] ἀσχολία can refer to a campaign, military preparations, military service (Thuc. 8.72; Xen. *Eq. Mag.* 5.9; Theopomp. *FGrH* 115 F 224.11), law trials (Antiphon 6.12; cf. 13 and [Dem.] 44.4), any public or private case (Xen. *Mem.* 3.11.16), the duties of the archons and involvement in politics (Pl. *Ap.* 39e; [*Ep.* 9] 357e), anything connected with securing the daily necessities of life and food (Pl. *Phd.* 66d; cf. Dem. 21.141 and Epicurus *Ep.* 2.85), the practice of medicine (Pl. *Resp.* 406b), the construction of public works (Arist. *Pol.* 1313b25) and so on and so forth. Frequently, with no specific definition of what it means, ἀσχολία refers in a very vague way to the pressure of the obligations which someone has, or alleges that he has, to perform (e.g. Xen. *Cyr.* 2.2.30; [Lys.] 6.34; Eubulus fr. 119.12); cf. n. 28. É. Benveniste, 'Sur l'histoire du mot latin negotium', *ASNSP* serie 2.20 (1951), 23, perceptively points out the breadth of the concept: 'le sens positif d'«occupation» . . . le sens très général d'«affaire» pour indiquer tout ce qui peut requérir l'activité de l'homme'; in his exemplary study on the concept of *negotium*, Benveniste explains the paradoxical fact that a positive concept (occupation) is rendered with a compound word with a negative morphology (*neg–otium*) by stating that the ancient Indo-European world was at a loss to refer to certain novel activities (in his case large-scale commerce) as anything other than 'un empêchement de se livrer à un autre chose'; ἀσχολία, of which *negotium* is, after all, a calque, is defined as 'absence de loisir pour se vouer à quelque chose' (23–5).

[26] See, in the sense of 'to lack time'/'to be busy', the periphrasis ἄσχολος εἶναι (rarely with the infinitive): Arist. *Pol.* 1313b20 (in securing daily bread); 28 (in war); Dem. 3.27 (in war). Also, ἄσχολος ἄγεσθαι: Aristox. fr. 39.9 Wehrli (in exercises); γίγνεσθαι: [Dem.] 10.47 (in war), etc.

[27] In Xenophon, on one occasion (*Cyr.* 4.3.12) ἀσχολία is correlated with τέχναι, but disjunctively to farming or τὰ οἰκεῖα.

[28] Thus the periphrasis ἀσχολίαν (or: in pl.) (παρ)ἔχειν simply conveys the notion of 'to lack (or: deprive someone of) time for . . .', therefore 'to be [or: to keep] busy' (rarely with the infinitive: Xen. *Ages.* 1.7; *Cyr.* 4.3.12, 8.1.13, 3.50, 7.13; *Hell.* 6.1.16; *Mem.* 1.3.11, 3.11.16; *Oec.* 4.3, 6.9; *Eq.* 3.12; Pl. *Phd.* 66b); cf. ἄσχολον παρέχειν (Pl. *Leg.* 832b) or ποιεῖν (with the infinitive: Pl. *Leg.* 831c). Also, ἀσχολίαν κατασκευάζειν (Dem. 8.18), παρασκευάζειν (Pl. *Leg.* 807c), or μηχανᾶσθαι (Xen. *Lac.* 3.3). Corresponding periphrases for σχολή: παρέχειν (with the infinitive: Xen. *Cyr.* 8.3.48; *Hiero* 10.5.5; cf. λαμβάνειν: Eur. *IT* 1432), κατασκευάζειν (Xen. *Cyr.* 8.1.16) or, later, παρασκευάζειν ([Arist.] *Mag. Mor.* 1.34.31–2 *bis*); also, διδόναι (with the infinitive: Xen. *Cyr.* 4.2.22). Cf. n. 15.

[29] See e.g. Isoc. 4.112; Xen. *An.* 5.1.9; *Mem.* 2.6.4 or Pl. *Resp.* 406c–d *bis* (κάμνειν).

'work', though in an equivocal, fragile way (*Pol.* 1305a20: ἄσχολον ὄντα . . . πρὸς τοῖς ἔργοις). We get the same impression if we compare, in Plato, the phrase σχολὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἄγων (see below), which seems to mean the same thing (that is, liberation from all employment), to the phrase τοῦ πᾶσαν τῶν ἄλλων πάντων ἔργων βίου ἀσχολίαν παρασκευάζοντος (*Leg.* 807c), especially since the latter appears in a slightly different form (ἀσχολίαν κατασκευάζειν) in Demosthenes, meaning 'to devise impediments and bring about procrastination' (8.18).[30]

Equally problematic is the dual categorization of human activities which, it is frequently asserted, are clearly proper to the state of σχολή and the equivalent of ἀσχολία: when Socrates, in his *Apology*, reflects upon his obsessive ἀσχολία, that is, the pursuit of wisdom, he acknowledges that it has deprived him of all σχολή for public affairs or his own personal profit; indeed, while he was falling into utter poverty, he adds, his wealthy young imitators were spending their abundant σχολή in antics which aroused the displeasure of their fellow citizens (23b–c). Although this, the sad fate of all true philosophers, should hardly surprise us, we would not expect the practice of philosophy to be considered ἀσχολία, that is, the absence of σχολή, and the livelihood of ordinary people the exploitation of their σχολή;[31] nor, indeed, would it be clearly understandable, if the word were appropriate to the practice of philosophy, how Socrates' young superficial devotees could be wasting their own σχολή, when it was precisely from the lack of it that their mentor was suffering. Then again, if we attributed this inverted use of the concepts to Socratic irony, we should at least have to accept that it is unwarrantedly aimed at the only state which enables the philosopher to devote himself undistractedly to the object of his ardent enthusiasm. Besides, there is no trace of irony in a similar case, when Anarcharsis (not without mistrust) describes the Greeks πάντας ἀσχόλους . . . ἐς πᾶσαν σοφίην πλὴν Λακεδαιμονίων (Hdt. 4.77) and, consequently, wisdom tacitly as pre-eminently ἀσχολία.

With these reservations in mind regarding its contrast with ἀσχολία, we can now look at the points where σχολή coincides with or diverges from its associated concepts, the closest of which is undoubtedly ἀργία, especially if we take for granted any connotation it may have with work. Aristotle and, more emphatically, contemporary scholars constantly emphasize the distinction between the two concepts, especially the 'active' nature of σχολή.[32] All the same, even if this clarification seems adequate within a range of forms of leisure, it says little about the compass of its supposed opposite, work. Thus, σχολή sometimes really does appear to be synonymous with ἀργία, and it therefore seems that there is no clear dividing line between the two concepts, that is, a kind of confusion rather than just a shifting of the meaning of σχολή from 'leisure' to 'idleness'.[33] This, at least is what is suggested by the wording of the famous Socratic

[30] Cf., however, Eur. fr. 579.2: σχολὴ μ' ἀπείργε (from asking a question), in the sense of the lack of σχολή, i.e. of ἀσχολία.

[31] See, however, Xen. *Hiero* 10.5: σχολὴν παρέχειν τοῖς πολίταις τῶν ἰδίων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι and Pl. *Leg.* 961b: ἡνίκ' ἂν τῶν ἄλλων πράξεων ἰδίων τε καὶ κοινῶν καὶ μάλιστ' ᾗ τις σχολὴ παντί; cf. Arist. *Pol.* 1308b36: πρὸς τοῖς ἰδίοις σχολάζειν.

[32] See J. L. Stocks, 'ΣΧΟΛΗ', *CQ* 30 (1936), 181; Benveniste (n. 25), 23; Mikkola (n. 10), 73, 76; Solmsen (n. 8), 193; Loraux (n. 16); Balme (n. 4), 140. Often, in order to underline this distinction, mention is made of the particular zeal shown by Seneca, in whom the ideal of σχολή apparently survived—the prime goal of man in the Greek city-state—that he should distinguish active contemplation from forms of inactivity that constitute a virtual and premature death. See de Grazia (n. 1), 21 and A.-L. Motto and J. R. Clark, '*Hic situs est*: Seneca on the deadliness of idleness', *CW* 72 (1978/9), 208–10, 214; cf. J.-M. André, '«Otium» et vie contemplative dans les «Lettres à Lucilius»', *REL* 40 (1962), 126–7.

[33] Descat (n. 4), 211–13, talks about a phenomenon of 'assimilation', after the archaic period,

assertion ἡ ἀργία ἀδελφὴ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἐστί, which is preserved by Aelian (*VH* 10.14) and in which the replacement of the σχολή usually found in similar contexts is surprising; it is also suggested by the parallel inevitably to be drawn between this statement and the well-known anecdote about the Spartan visitor, whose profound contempt for mechanical and pecuniary ἀσχολία caused him greatly to admire one who had just been condemned for ἀργία, regarding him as something of a martyr for freedom (Plut. *Lyc.* 24.3: ὁ τὴν ἐλευθερίας ἑαλωκὼς δίκην). Furthermore, that this confusion is not fortuitous (the apophthegm in Aelian may not preserve the authentic wording, but the work-related terms ἀργότατοι and ἐργαστικώτατοι are used) is confirmed by the fact that Socrates, himself a champion of idealized σχολή, was accused by the Sophist Polycrates in his *Accusation* of issuing exhortations in favour of ἀργία. Traces of defence in Xenophon (*Mem.* 1.2.56), though mainly in Libanius, who in his details probably followed Polycrates' original pamphlet, allow us to reconstruct a caricature of Socratic teaching, according to which sitting about and sleeping are superior to work, handicrafts, farming, trade, seafaring, and shipbuilding (*Decl.* 1.13; 127).

Libanius seeks to refute the image of a group of people gazing thoughtfully at the sky and expecting their daily bread to descend to them from on high, and re-establishes the truth by restricting the Socratic advice to what concerns the superiority of the soul (and to a lesser extent the body) over money, while also denouncing the accumulation of wealth as the sole source of well-being (127). He also points out that Socrates' iron fortitude in battle was not compatible with the flabbiness to which his supposed ἀργία would have led (131), and he seals his refutation of the censure with the pun relating to the man who lives in a state of ἀργία (ἀργῶν), while constantly working for the general good (133: ἐργαζόμενος . . . τὰ πάντων ὠφελιμώτατα, εὐεργέτης). Ultimately, for Libanius (in contrast to what Aelian would have suspected), ἀργία intrudes on the distortion of Socratic teaching precisely in order to assail its moral integrity.[34] However, more important with regard to our subject is the fact that Polycrates employed the fine nuances of the concepts in his distorted portrayal of Socrates to convince the Athenians of his case less than a decade after the turn of the fifth century. Furthermore, we should link this with the fact that Athenian law considered ἀργία an offence and demanded—regardless of how widely its provisions in this respect were implemented—that it be punished;[35] as also with the fact that there was a widespread view in the sphere of ethics that out of πόνος—albeit sometimes intolerable and with negative connotations—comes virtue;[36] then we have

arising out of the ideological modification of ἀργία; the difference between the two concepts may be summed up in the fact that '[σχολή] est pleinement compatible avec l'idée d'ἔργον', insofar as it is reserved for culture and public life.

[34] See J. Humbert, 'Le pamphlet de Polycratès et le Gorgias de Platon', *RPh* 57 (1931), 26–31. For the substance of the censure, its connotations, and its refutation in Xenophon, see O. Gigon, *Sokrates. Sein Bild in Dichtung und Geschichte* (Bern, 1947), 139–42.

[35] See Dem. 57.32; Plut. *Sol.* 17.2; cf. Lys. fr. p. 334.17–22 Thalheim; Theophr. fr. 99.1 and D.L. 1.55. For the sources and the literature, see Descat (n. 4), 208–10 and cf. Balme (n. 4), 143; for how widely the relevant legislation was applied, see Nenci (n. 4), 334–5.

[36] See Hippoc. *Aër.* 23: καὶ ἀπὸ μὲν ἡσυχίης καὶ ῥᾳθυμίης ἡ δειλία αὔξεται, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς ταλαιπωρίης καὶ τῶν πόνων αἱ ἀνδρεῖαι (for the antithesis between ταλαιπωρίη and ῥᾳθυμίη, and also σχολή, cf. *Acut.* 12). The relevant passages are collected together in D. Lau, *Der lateinische Begriff 'labor'* (Munich, 1975), 32–6; cf. B. van den Hoven, *Work in Ancient and Medieval Thought* (Amsterdam, 1996), 28–31. For the rift between the conception of work, on the one hand, as a collective endeavour in the context of a fruitful meeting between gods and man, and, on the other, as the inescapable and painful fate of man, see C. Jourdain-Annequin, 'Travail

sufficient reason to wonder whether the idealization of σχολή could freely overcome the resistance, penetrate the prevailing mindset, and take on the wide range with which it is presented within the eclectic scope of its philosophical treatment.

These questions come up against the categorical way mention is frequently made by modern scholars of a passage in Euripides' *Ion*, which, at first sight, seems to show that, at least in the decades leading up to the *Apology*, there was a distinct change in the connotations of σχολή, that is, that it was elevated to the state of an ἀγαθόν. More specifically, while the other tragic heroes hasten to make use of their time and renounce their σχολή,[37] the young Ion manifests the opposite tendency, seeking to conserve it, or rather to 'reclaim' it: refusing to leave Delphi and settle in Athens, he idealizes the φιλτάτην ἀνθρώπῳ σχολήν, the enjoyment of which is bound up with the other benefits (ἀγαθά) of life outside a large city inimical to virtue (634).[38] Ion does not specify what this σχολή entails; however his life at the sanctuary—since assuming the duties of treasurer upon attaining his majority (54–5)—can hardly be described as idle. So his distaste does not seem to relate to employment in general, but rather to the tyranny of the demands of public mainly political life, and Ion rejects the ἀσχολία of the free citizens with all its connotations in the depressing circumstances of the second decade before the end of the fifth century. Consequently, even if the passage really does confirm a shift in the meaning of σχολή to that of desirable leisure, it is in the sense of the voluntary disposal of one's time, not a rejection of work. After all, in *Hippolytus*, after ἀργία has been deprecated, the μακραὶ λέσχαι and σχολή are specified as being among the ἡδοναί which hamper the pursuit of the good, and indeed they are described as a τερπνὸν κακόν (384). Euripides thus reduces that ἀγαθόν which Ion refuses to part with to the level of a—rather base—human weakness, that is, the wasting of time, very like ἀργία and its associated concepts.

Nevertheless, when Antisthenes later boasts in Xenophon's *Symposium* that he possesses τὸ ἁβρότατόν γε κτῆμα, τὴν σχολήν (4.44), we receive the impression that he is intentionally using the term with a much more precise understanding of its significance. Despite any ambiguity in the adjective ἁβρός,[39] there can be no doubt whatever that Antisthenes is thinking of the virtues of the βίος θεωρητικός: he goes sightseeing, listens to what is worth hearing, and, most importantly, spends every moment of every day with Socrates (σχολάζων). Ion and Antisthenes seem to be separated by a substantial gap, which was covered, certainly, by the Platonic—and later the Aristotelian—treatment of σχολή, which semantically influenced the use of the word in a number of examples from the fourth century.[40] Nonetheless, although Xenophon appoints himself in this case a champion of the idealized aspect of σχολή,

et discours mythique', in J. Annequin et al. (edd.), *Le Travail. Recherches historiques* (Paris, 1999), 37–9.

[37] See *Andr.* 552 (VS. θᾶσσον); *HF* 725; *IT* 1220, 1432; *Med.* 1238 (VS. τάχιστα); *Tro.* 911. Cf. fr. 563.1, 579.2 and 835.4.

[38] L. B. Carter, *The Quiet Athenian* (Oxford, 1986), 160–1, points out that this is 'the first time anyone has ever claimed [σχολή] as a good', and interprets Ion's leisure as 'a link in the chain that connects ἀπραγμοσύνη with the βίος θεωρητικός, though without being identified with the latter; for the uniqueness of Ion's attitude, cf. F. Boll, *Vita contemplativa* [SB Heidelberger Akad. Wissenschaften] (1920), 5. See also P. Demont, *La citè grecque archaïque et classique et l'idéal de tranquillité* (Paris, 1990), 165ff.

[39] For its gradual shift towards a more negative sense, see L. Kurke, 'The politics of ἁβροσύνη in archaic Greece', *ClAnt* 11 (1992), 98ff.

[40] See Arist. *Protr.* fr. 56 Düring: τὸ πάντας φιλοχωρεῖν ἐπ' αὐτῇ (sc. τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ) καὶ βούλεσθαι σχολάζειν ἀφεμένους τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων; in actual fact, however, it seems

he does not seem fully to have assimilated its significance himself. This at least is what emerges from his attempt to attribute to Socrates a definition (*Mem.* 3.9.9: *σχολὴν δὲ σκοπῶν, τί εἴη, ποιοῦντας μέν τι τοὺς πλείστους εὑρίσκειν ἔφη*) which could potentially be applied *tel quel* to *ἀσχολία*. Ultimately, however, and in a puzzling kind of way, *σχολή*—and *σχολάζειν*—is exclusively confined to any activity that relates to *τὰ βελτίω*, and *ἀσχολία* to any that relates to *τὰ χείρω*, such as dice-playing and buffoonery.[41]

Xenophon's ineptitude is not surprising, if we bear in mind that both Plato and Aristotle likewise failed to give, or avoided giving, a definition of *σχολή*, a fact that has given rise to the conjecture that the term 'was . . . in current popular use' and therefore did not need explaining.[42] This certainly did not need explaining, provided that we ignore anything relating to the idealization of the term and its specialized philosophical dimension. In Plato, for instance, the connection between *σχολή* and the possibility of leading the *βίος θεωρητικός* is indeed a close one; but the fact is frequently underestimated that this idea is discussed at length only once in his entire *oeuvre*, and then in a way that is rather inappropriate to the establishing of a fundamental philosophical premise. In *Theaetetus*, it is Theodorus who introduces the concept of *σχολή* into the discussion, in response to Socrates' observation that their words are shifting to ever deeper questions; to which Socrates replies that in the course of such a debate it is indeed likely that the subject will change two or three times and that the debaters will expatiate or not at will. Furthermore, since his interlocutors do not appear to understand how this aspect of their debate reflects the antithesis between freemen and slaves, Socrates points out the thing that obviously refers to the fundamental parameter of time, i.e. the hour-glass, which presses speakers in the law-courts, but not philosophers (172c–d; cf. 187d). This is *ἀσχολία* in the strictest temporal sense of the word, with no discernible allusion to work, least of all in the context of a bipolar distinction. By contrast, *σχολή* is presented as that raw material which is a prerequisite for debate, but which is also consumed in the course of it, that is time (as, for instance, in *Leg.* 781e: *σχολῆς γὰρ ἀπολαύομεν καὶ οὐδὲν ἡμᾶς ἐστὶ τὸ κατεπεῖγον τὸ μὴ πάντῃ πάντως σκοπεῖν τὰ περὶ τοὺς νόμους*). This, however, is far from being a premeditated attempt to idealize *σχολή*, much less to reject any other activity; after all, work itself had much earlier been idealized as a 'valeur instrument' for acquiring the supreme good of happiness and prosperity,[43] and any attempt to undervalue it would do very little to strengthen the specific Platonic argument.

somewhat hasty to give an early date to the self-sufficient use of *σχολή* and its derivatives in the sense of philosophical pursuits; see Dem. 22.4, in similar contexts simply in the sense of 'spending one's life' (*τεχνίτης τοῦ λέγειν καὶ πάντα τὸν βίον ἐσχόλακεν [ἐν] τούτῳ*), as also in Isoc. 1.18 (*σχολή*). The case of *σχολή* in *Pol.* 1323b39: *ἑτέρας γάρ ἐστιν ἔργον σχολῆς ταῦτα* (sc. *πάντας τοὺς οἰκείους ἐπεξελθεῖν λόγους*), is frequently interpreted as something closer to 'branch of study' or 'science'; but one should not overlook the manifest connection between this use of the word and similar Platonic uses with regard to the treatment of a subject (*κατὰ σχολήν*, etc.). On the contrary, despite its fragmentary nature, the sense of 'teaching' seems more likely (specifically of the doctrine of the immortality of the soul) in a passage in Alexis, preserved by Diogenes Laertius among other taunts against Plato; however, the uncertain chronological bounds of its origin extend from the second half of the fourth century to the first decades of the third century B.C. (fr. 158.3).

[41] Cf. Stob. 3.30.16 (the wording changed, with two omissions); for this form of *σχολή*, cf. Gorg. fr. 11a.197; Ctesias *FGrH* 688 F 26.73. Cf., however, Soph. fr. 479.2–4 Radt: *χρόνου τε διατριβὰς σοφωτάτας ἐφηῦρε* (sc. *Παλαμήδης*) . . . *τερπνὸν ἀργίας ἄκος*.

[42] Stocks (n. 32).

[43] See N. I. Barbu, 'La hiérarchie des valeurs humaines chez Hésiode', *StudClass* 10 (1968), 209–12.

This passage from *Theaetetus* should not be viewed in isolation from a number of parallels in which σχολή is associated with thought, discourse, or dialogue. The case of *Hippolytus*, 384, where σχολή is correlated with the μακραὶ λέσχαι, has already been mentioned; by and large, sometimes σχολή appears to be a prerequisite for applying oneself to contemplative enquiry or its formulation, and sometimes the lack of it appears to be a reason for abandoning such activities.[44] Not unexpectedly, this usage is common—as also that of ἀσχολία and σχολάζω[45]—in the Platonic dialogues when the participants are referring to meeting together, exchanging views, listening, assiduously studying philosophical matters, and even writing.[46] So we need only bear in mind that we owe the dialogue between Socrates and Ischomachus to the supposedly unusual presence of Ischomachus in the agora, where he is idly waiting for some strangers (σχολάζειν, ἀναμένειν), and it is precisely this unoccupied time which Socrates hastens to fill with his questions (Xen. *Oec.* 7.1–2). All the same, this awareness of a category of intellectual concerns which only an abundance of σχολή makes it possible to pursue, even those which demand so much time that they overrun the time available for some specific dialogue and are postponed κατὰ σχολήν, that is, to some more convenient time,[47] should not be confused with any kind of idealization. On the contrary, the central point involved in the idealization of σχολή is reflected in the dilemma which Socrates poses his interlocutors in *Phaedrus*, when he invites them to choose *how* they will dispose of their σχολή: whether, that is, they will devote themselves to a creative dialogue or surrender to their indolence, to somnolence. Although there is nothing to preclude either option, they are warned that if they choose the latter they will be the laughing-stock even of the cicadas, who at high noon will think they are sheep crowding around the fountain to sleep (258e–259a).[48]

Socrates thus makes it clear that he prefers to make the pursuit of wisdom his principal and unremitting ἀσχολία, an occupation, that is, which—as he asserted in his *Apology*—absorbs all σχολή and is never banished to the sidelines to take its chance. In order to continue benefiting his fellow citizens with his teaching, he specifically

[44] Soph. *Aj.* 816; Eur. *Tro.* 911; fr. 579.2 Radt; Ar. *Ach.* 407–9 *bis*; *Nub.* 221; Isoc. 1.18; Xen. *Hiero* 1.1; *Symp.* 4.44; Dem. 24.158; Men. *Sam.* 20; cf. Eur. *Ion* 276.

[45] *Grg.* 458c; *Phd.* 58d; *Phdr.* 261b; *Prt.* 335c; *[Sis.]* 387b; [*Ep.* 13] 360e; see also n. 46. Cf. Eur. *Or.* 93; Xen. *Mem.* 3.6.6; Theophr. *Char.* 18.9 *bis*. In cases relating to social gatherings or dialogue, we find the rare syntactical examples of σχολάζω with a dative designating persons: Xen. *Cyr.* 7.5.39; Men. *Epit.* 224.

[46] See, mainly, on the threshold of the house where Protagoras was lodged (*Prt.* 314d), the doorkeeper's refusal to allow the renowned Sophist to receive Socrates and Hippocrates, son of Apollodorus: οὐ σχολὴ αὐτῷ (*bis*). Cf. *Ion* 530d; *[Just.]* 374b *bis*; *Leg.* 781e, 855d; *Phdr.* 227b, 229e *bis*; *Resp.* 376d, 500b; *[Sis.]* 387d; *Tht.* 154e, 172c.

[47] See *Leg.* 738b, 771c, 858b, 951a; *Phdr.* 228a; *Plt.* 263b; *Resp.* 619c; *Soph.* 226e; *Tht.* 143a; *Ti.* 24a, 38e; [*Ep.* 13] 360e. Cf., in various contexts, Ar. *Eccl.* 48; Arist. *Soph. El.* 177a8; Dem. 20.94, 24.26, 187; Men. *Aspis* 94; *Epit.* 538, 869; *Pk.* 159. The periphrases ἐν σχολῇ (Xen. *Oec.* 8.15) and ἐπὶ σχολῆς (Pl. *Euthphr.* 6c; *Tht.* 180b; Aeschin. 3.191; cf. Pl. *Leg.* 858b) are found only sporadically in a similar sense. Related prepositional locutions, such as κατὰ καιρόν (in the sense of not only 'au bon moment' but rather 'comme il faut', see M. Trédé, *Kairos. L'à-propos et l'occasion.* Études et Commentaires 103 [Paris, 1992], 62; cf. ἐν καιρῷ) or κατὰ χρόνον (in its consolidated usage), clearly diverge from the purely temporal sense of κατὰ σχολήν; the prepositional phrase κατὰ ἀργίαν is unattested, while ἐν ἀργίᾳ (Pl. *Ti.* 89e) probably conveys the state or condition, and not the temporal process of living through it. The isolated case (probably in the third century B.C.) of Timon, fr. 840.6 *Supp. Hell.*, according to which mortal drones squander their accumulated fortune ἐνὶ σχολῇ, may be regarded as very close to ἐν ἀργίᾳ, though as an alternative to a form of wasting σχολή in disreputable activities (see n. 41).

[48] There is a simile of the same sort (προβατίου βίον) in Aristophanes (*Plut.* 921–2), though with reference to ἀργός (ἡσυχίαν ἔχων ζῆν ἀργός).

demands that he be provided with free meals at the prytaneum (*Ap.* 36d). Further, if sleep or work or anything else emerges to rival this occupation and to demand—in terms of the finite nature of time—σχολή for itself, this puts the philosopher's dedication to his mission to the test, but does not in itself constitute a feature of his special place in the world. The same also applies, of course, to the virtuous ruler: Xenophon links the famous pyramidal official hierarchy of the Persian state with Cyrus' desire to curtail all ἀσχολία relating to his possessions and secure for himself some σχολή, and indeed more than a mere householder or shipowner would enjoy. His essential aim was to devote this σχολή to important matters of governance (τῶν κρατίστων or τῆς τῶν ὅλων σωτηρίας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι), or in other words ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ ἔργα (*Cyr.* 8.1.12–16). The whole question is clarified in the *Republic*, when reference is made to the necessity that the execution of a task not be dependent on the σχολή of any professional (370b–c). There should, instead, be a professional always available to respond to the needs of the task in question, σχολὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἄγων (that is, who takes time from all other concerns). Quite obviously, in this case the discourse is not about leisure as opposed to work, but the time itself which is potentially intended for work; which time, however, the professional sometimes does indeed devote entirely to his art and sometimes not. The phrase σχολὴν τῶν ἄλλων is repeated three more times in Plato, most notably in the account of the city guardians, whose mission σχολῆς τε τῶν ἄλλων πλείστης ἂν εἴη (374e).[49] On the basis of its parallels, the same applies to the city guardians as to the professionals, namely they should devote themselves exclusively to their ἔργον, forestalling any other drain on their time. The fact that their own ἔργον is manifestly incompatible with manual labour may possibly be purely fortuitous as far as the meaning of σχολή is concerned.[50]

Certainly, Aristotle did much to invest the concept of σχολή with positive connotations and to idealize it;[51] indeed, its elevation to a supreme good was accompanied by such a systematic structuring of its meaning that it acquired the form of a minutely elaborated deontological framework. Despite the points of similarity to the Platonic use of the concept, its use by Aristotle involves heuristic aspects which, if we look at them closely, reveal a specialized use. This use, as we have already noted, did not so much override the current meaning of the term, as supersede it, even though this process as a whole did not ultimately lead up to a strictly formulated definition. We must begin by noting that ἄσχολος is unprecedently used as an adjectival adjunct of πράξεις rather than of people: political and polemical πράξεις are described as ἄσχολοι three times in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, because they aspire to some purpose and are not chosen for their own nature, in contrast to an intellectual action, which aspires only to τὴν ἡδονὴν οἰκείαν . . . καὶ τὸ αὔταρκες δὴ καὶ σχολαστικὸν καὶ ἄτρυτον (1177b4–22). Clearly, then, what political and polemical acts lack is the element of an *a priori* idealized σχολή. Otherwise, all human acts, without exception,

[49] Cf. *La.* 187a; *Leg.* 961b; *Resp.* 374c; *Ti.* 18b; also, sporadically, Xen. *Cyr.* 8.3.47 and Arist. *Pol.* 1269a35.

[50] The passage is often misinterpreted: instead of 'more leisure than . . .', B. Jowett and L. Campbell, *Plato's Republic* (Oxford, 1894), 92, already noted the parallels and the interpretation 'leisure from other pursuits'.

[51] See, contradicting the notion that Aristotle simply borrowed the corresponding Platonic view, R. Gauthier in R. A. Gauthier and J. Y. Jolif, *L'Éthique à Nicomaque* (Paris, 1959), 2.2, 869. More generally, see P. Demont, 'Le loisir dans la *Politique* d'Aristote', in P. Aubenque and A. Tordesillas (edd.), *Aristote politique* (Paris, 1993), 209–30 and W. Kullmann, 'Aristote et le loisir', in J.-M. André et al. (edd.), *Les loisirs et l'héritage de la culture classique*, Collection Latomus 230 (Brussels, 1996), 104–12.

are by nature ἄσχολοι in that they take up time, and Aristotle surely does not have such a truism in mind. In this connection, a comparison with the expression χρόνον ἄσχολον (ποιεῖν), which is a *hapax* in Plato (*Leg.* 831c), is enlightening: this is the time which has entirely, unilaterally been taken up by something, but in Aristotle the adjective conveys a qualitative characteristic of the πράξεις, as it does elsewhere of human intellect (*Pol.* 1337b14) or of the motion of heavenly bodies (*Cael.* 284a31). Thus, when it is necessary to name the converse—literally unattested—μὴ ἄσχολοι πράξεις, Aristotle seems to avoid the rare and negatively charged σχολαῖος in favour of σχολαστικός, a newly created adjective found, apart from in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, three times in the *Politics* describing groups of people, cities, and nations, twice in fact in the comparative form.[52] In this way, however, σχολή seems to have moved perceptibly away from its generally understood original meaning.

On the other hand, the elevation of σχολαστικός to a positive virtue presupposes that the verb σχολάζω, from which it was derived, was now invested with positive connotations. In its current sense, as defined by a number of earlier and later examples, the verb simply related to spare time, that is, 'to have nothing [else] to do';[53] and in fact not always in a positive sense, at least if one considers the perception reflected in the Hippocratic aphorism ὅπη οὐκ ἀργίη, οὐδὲ μὴν κακίη· τὸ γὰρ σχολάζον καὶ ἄπρηκτον ζητέει ἐς κακίην καὶ ἀφέλκεσθαι (*Decent.* 1), a somewhat similar echo of which does not seem to have died out in Menander's time.[54] Aristotle appears to be familiar with this neutral or negative use of the verb, but he distinguishes σχολάζειν from the concept of πονεῖν, presumably commensurately with what he describes as ἄτρυτον in intellectual activity. In fact he supplements the precision of this contradistinction by making σχολάζειν an—actual or notional—object of learning and practice.[55] In this case, σχολάζειν presumably relates to a preselected, obviously prestigious activity, such as the mathematical sciences (*Metaph.* 981b23–5),[56] and is filled by σχολή of predetermined quality, which, again, is anything but self-evident in common experience. On the contrary, such σχολή presupposes specific mechanisms

[52] 1313b4, 1322b37, and 1341a28. In contrast to σχολαστικός, the derivative σχολαστής is not found until much later in Strabo (as a compound: συσχολαστής) and Plutarch. From the New Comedy comes an excerpt from an unknown comic writer, quoted by Johannes Stobaeus (= Antip. Stoic., Περὶ γάμου: Adesp. incert. 119.1 *CAF* (3.430–1).

[53] Sometimes with the infinitive: Eur. *Hec.* 730; Thuc. 4.4; Ar. *Lys.* 412, fr. 107.2; Pherecr. fr. 20.1; Xen. *An.* 2.3.3, 7.3.25; *Cyr.* 2.1.9, 7.1.20, 8.1.18; *Lac.* 6.3; *Mem.* 3.9.9 *bis*, 11.16; *Oec.* 7.1–2 *ter*; Pl. *Leg.* 694e, 763d; *Menex.* 94e (cf. *[Virt.]* 378c); Timotheus Lyr. fr. 10.2 Page; Aeschin. 3.227; Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 16.3; *HA* 547a28; *Eth. Nic.* 1160a27; Theophr. *Char.* 16.11a, 24.5, fr. 114.1. In various contexts, the meaning of the verb ranges from the negative equivalent of 'to waste time' (as in Aesch. *Supp.* 209) to the neutral sense of abstention from any initiative ([Lys.] 9.14); its use in locutions such as ὁ λόγος σχολάζει (Arist. *Part. An.* 682a34), i.e. 'to treat more extensively', is also neutral, but not unconnected with the previous uses. Cf. nn. 19, 45.

[54] Cf. *Sent.* 1.704 Meineke (= *Sent. Byz.* 658 Jäkel): πολλοὶ σχολὴν ἄγουσιν εἰς τὰ χείρονα; *Sent. Pap.* 3.6 Jäkel (= *Sent. Byz.* 875): ὡς πολλὰ θνητοῖς ἡ σχολὴ ποιεῖ κακά. Cf. *Sent.* 624 Jäkel, where σχολή is viewed in contradistinction to life as a whole: οὐ τῇ σχολῇ δεῖ, τῷ βίῳ δ' εὐσχημονεῖν. Cf. with mildly negative connotations in Arist. *Pol.* 1256a32, and with strong disapproval in Dem. 3.35.

[55] See, mainly, *Pol.*, book 8, ch. 3; cf. 1271b5.

[56] G. Nenci ('Économie et société chez Hérodote', in *Association Guillaume Budé. Actes du IXe Congrès (Rome, 13–18 avril 1973)* [Paris, 1975], 1.144) correctly concludes that the Egyptian priests 'n'avaient pas de préoccupations économiques'; however, the verb σχολάζειν literally seems to relate not to the sphere of the activities from which the priests abstain (as, for instance, would be the case for the locution σχολὴν τῶν ἄλλων), but rather to the sphere of those in which they actively engage. In this we can see a tendency to 'specialize' the term, of which the later use of σχολή in the sense of 'school' is the most representative example.

and is subject to strict criteria. In this context we also have to include the creation of compounds, namely ἐνσχολάζω and ἀποσχολάζω, which are found for the first time.[57] The first relates to the free citizens who spend their time in the agora which is exclusively reserved for their political activities (*Pol.* 1331b12); the second, by contrast, relates to the futile amusements (τῶν παιδιῶν αἱ ἡδεῖαι [sc. πράξεις]) with which tyrants and their sycophants occupy themselves (*Eth. Nic.* 1176b17).

Apart from using σχολαστικός as an antonym for ἄσχολος, though not for people, Aristotle perfects his conceptual apparatus for treating σχολή by using the plural σχολαί and the active verb form ἀσχολέω. With regard to the σχολαί, Plato already mentions σχολαί which are worthy of young people, that is, consisting of discussions in which they take the measure of their skills in dealing with useful and important questions, in contrast to the games in which older people waste their time (*Leg.* 820c). Aristotle in his turn notes that the prohibiting of σχολαί, along with the banning of the creation of σύλλογοι σχολαστικοί, is the chief concern of tyrannical regimes (*Pol.* 1313b3). The meaning of the term may be extended here from 'non-work', that is, the possession of spare time, to the equivalent of free time for discussion, or even of coming together with other people; however, the logical conclusion that these uses of the plural (parallels of which are also found for ἀργία) are just traces of a process of instantiation of the meaning (that is, quantification and individualization of its appearances) is unavoidable.[58] Further, it seems reasonable to suppose a formation by analogy with the already common plural form of ἀσχολία, which was instantiated much earlier.[59] Aristotle seems to be seeking a similar analogy between the group of derivatives of σχολή and ἀσχολία in his use of the active form ἀσχολέω, presumably equivalent to σχολάζω, rather than the rare dynamic middle ἀσχολέομαι.[60]

Even if it is considered fortuitous that almost all of these examples come from the *Politics*, they create the impression that the meaning of σχολή underwent a methodical process of elaboration, in which it would not be unreasonable to see traces of 'invention', which, of course—to follow Eino Mikkola's conclusions—was abandoned, as in Aristotle's writings the quest for the ideal constitution gave way to a realistic systematic approach.[61] This process of elaboration is reflected in the famous treatment

[57] Earlier only the verb κατασχολάζειν (τοῦ χρόνου . . . τὶ κατασχολάζειν) is found as a compound of σχολάζειν, in the sense of excessive time-wasting (Soph. *Ph.* 127).

[58] The same process involves the quantification of σχολή by the use of adjectives, mainly πολλή (Aesch. *PV* 818; Isoc. 15.39; Xen. *Cyr.* 8.1.15; *Mem.* 1.6.9; Pl. *Leg.* 813c, 951a; *Phdr.* 229e; *Plt.* 272b; *Resp.* 374e; *Tht.* 154e; *[Sis.]* 387d), once ἄφθονος (Eur. *Andr.* 732), and also μακραίων (Soph. *Aj.* 193); cf. Lysippus fr. 1–2.6 Meineke (μεγάλη); Pl. *Leg.* 832d (μεγίστη). Also οὐδαμῶς (Pl. *Phdr.* 229e), πάνυ (Xen. *Cyr.* 5.1.8), τοσαύτη (Isoc. 4.112; Men. *Epit.* 1084). Similar uses are not found in Aristotle, but cf. also n. 52 (σχολαστικώτερος). For ἀργία (in the plural), see Isoc. 7.44, 9.42; Pl. *Leg.* 761a; cf. Hippoc. *Epid.* 6.8.9; for ἀσχολία, see Xen. *Lac.* 3.3; Pl. *Leg.* 807c.

[59] Xen. *An.* 7.5.16; *Cyr.* 8.7.13; *Eq. Mag.* 5.9; *Oec.* 4.3; Aeschin. 2.16; Arist. *Pol.* 1337b37; *Fr.* 56.4; Epicurus *Ep.* 2.85; *Ep.* fr. 109.2–8 Arrighetti, *bis*; cf. Xen. *Mem.* 1.3.11 (πολλή); Pl. *Phd.* 66b (μυρίαι); *Prt.* 458c (τοσαύτη).

[60] *Pol.* 1299b33, 1333a41, 1334a38, 1337b31 and 39, 1338a3–4 *ter*; by contrast, the middle ἀσχολέομαι is found only once (*Eth. Nic.* 1177b5); however, cf. Ctesias *FGrH* 688 F 35.8; Ephorus *FGrH* 70 F 97.5 (?); Thphr. *Char.* 12.2; Alexis fr. 205.1 and 261.12; from the Hippocratic corpus, *Ep.* 17.166). Conversely, the dynamic middle σχολάζομαι is found once in Sophocles (fr. 314.281 Radt). For the dynamic/intensive middle see, generally, J. Gonda, 'Reflections on the Indo-European medium', *Lingua* 9 (1960), 47–9, 180.

[61] Mikkola (n. 10), 84–7. Cf., however, Welskopf (n. 17), 209, nn. 1, 1a, who rejects Mikkola's findings relating to σχολή as regards the indications of the dating of the successive composition of the books of the *Politics* (as does Solmsen [n. 8], 197, n. 19), but above all she discreetly (though no less hastily and factitiously) deprecates the investigation of the concept insofar as it

of σχολή shortly before the exposition of the fundamental directions of education in the seventh book of the *Politics*, and is organized in sharp contrast to ἀσχολία, focusing on the activation of the rational part of the psyche, and, more specifically, on its speculative part, in order to serve the goal of the perfect life (τὸ τέλος τῆς ἀρίστης ζωῆς). More particularly, the sphere of σχολή is directed towards the virtues and the supreme purpose (τὰ καλά or τὰ βελτίω καὶ τὰ τέλη). That of ἀσχολία, not being an act which embodies its own aim, but merely a means to some external aim, is directed towards acquiring what is necessary (τὰ ἀναγκαῖα καὶ χρήσιμα). Consequently, τὰ καλά rates above τὰ ἀναγκαῖα in the application of the general principles, attested by nature and art, that αἰεὶ γὰρ τὸ χεῖρον τοῦ βελτίονός ἐστιν ἕνεκεν and βέλτιον . . . τὸ λόγον ἔχον (1333a16–1334b5).[62] If one follows the natural course of this line of reasoning, it is obvious that ἀσχολία is being put to the standard teleological test of the Aristotelian method. We are talking, ultimately, about all the things that oppress human life and sometimes cause mortals to be overwhelmed by a sense of futility: σχολή offers itself as a satisfactory answer to the imperative question of their purpose in life (*Eth. Nic.* 1177b4–5 and *Pol.* 1334a15–16). In our opinion, herein lies the further idealization of σχολή, the demarcation, that is, of the two spheres of σχολή and ἀσχολία, in parallel with the planning of the ideal state.

In this context, it is natural to conclude that the free citizens in the ideal state are released from work and live in a state of leisure; but we must not overlook the fact that Aristotle avoids using terms that literally indicate work or non-work. The explanation undoubtedly lies in the fact that the concept of ἀσχολία has expanded to such a degree that it includes all ways of using time to the detriment of cultivating the mind (διαγωγή), to the extent, indeed, that elsewhere even engagement in politics is rejected as an occupation (*Eth. Nic.* 1177b12–18), thus reflecting the demand for increased freedom with regard to social lifestyle stereotypes and obligations towards the state.[63] Correspondingly, σχολή is understood as an increasingly large portion of the time which people demand for cultivation of the mind, which, when taken to a Utopian extreme, can voraciously use up all the time available to mortals. From this point of view, the meaning of σχολή is no different from the elementary meaning of 'possession of time', whereas the Aristotelian treatment seems to focus exclusively on the qualitative definition and way of managing this time, which is ideally free of any externally imposed purpose. To make a comparison with the current meaning of the term in Aristotle's time, Aristotle himself coincidentally preserves a proverb, οὐ σχολὴ δούλοις, which he cites in support of his argument that slaves do not accumulate, during their ἀσχολία, the prerequisites to secure σχολή; above all, that is, they lack the virtue of valour (1334a21). Clearly, the meaning of σχολή does not relate here to slaves' occasional abstention from work, but to the loss of their independent control of their own time; it is therefore obvious that the teleological axiom that we have just mentioned on how σχολή and ἀσχολία are connected with each other is not valid in the case of slavery. Free citizens are correspondingly entitled to σχολή, in that they are

diverges from (or rather does not confirm) the investigation of the historical phenomenon and problem.

[62] See, in brief, E. Barker, *The Politics of Aristotle* (Oxford, 1946), 323–4, n. GGG. For the influence of the Platonic *Laws* and the idealized model of Sparta, and also for the significance of the teleological continuity between σχολή and ἀσχολία, see E. Koller, 'Müsse und musische Paideia. Über die Musikaporetik in der aristotelischen Politik', *MH* 13 (1956), 15–20.

[63] See V. Ehrenberg, *Neugründer des Staates* (Munich, 1925), 115, and Mikkola (n. 10), 85, n. 2. Cf. for leisure and the antithetical pair πολυπραγμοσύνη / ἡσυχία, ἀπραγμοσύνη Koller (n. 62), 20–2.

free, as self-sufficient personalities, to spend their time as they decide; however, they do not, of course, abstain from ἀσχολία. Indeed, it is during their ἀσχολία that they demonstrate the virtues which prove them being worthy of σχολή.

Aristotle's treatment of σχολή, which everything we have said so far tends to suggest is normative and evaluative, is certainly not a more or less accurate empirical reflection of aspects of the mindset of fourth-century society. However, perhaps in part because of its privileged place in the surviving sources, the aristocratic ideal has frequently so fascinated scholars that, in the depiction of the everyday life of the upper social strata, tangible, cross-checked information is sometimes confused with the dictates of the model lifestyle beloved of ancient intellectuals. Thus, in order to reconstruct the lengthy process which shaped the social identity of the élite at an individual and collective level, we frequently turn to a wide range of such 'proper' choices, from the praxis of consumption to dietetics;[64] and it is precisely in this context that σχολή comes into its own. Apart from this view, we are most usually torn between two representations of daily life, not necessarily incompatible with each other, but having clearly different centres of gravity. In the fact, for instance, that an Athenian of the upper class wore his *himation* unpinned and went about unarmed we may perhaps recognize a conspicuous display of his unconcern for any manual work.[65] On the other hand, indulgence in this habit existed alongside the set of values underlying the well attested, if not widespread, criticism that the upper social stratum was soft, weak and useless to the community.[66] It was Hesiod and Thales who formulated the sharpest expression of these views when they condemned arrogant aristocratic behaviour and obsession with wealth and nobility, especially if wealth had been squandered or not stood the test of time.[67]

The behaviour of Xenophon's landowner presents us with another, more accurate picture. Remote from any desire to challenge the spirit of democratic equality, he appears in the agora merely in order to consort with friends and to attend to public affairs. Farming, as Xenophon notes, burdens the individual with comparatively minimal ἀσχολία, leaving him free to meet his social or political obligations (*Oec.* 4.3); at the opposite end of the scale, the mere mechanical arts—though no less, to recall

[64] See L. Foxhall, 'Cargoes of the heart's desire. The character of trade in the archaic Mediterranean world', in N. Fisher and H. van Wees (edd.), *Archaic Greece: New Approaches and New Evidence* (London, 1998), 297–8; S. M. DeHart, 'Hippocratic medicine and the Greek body image', *Perspectives on Science* 7 (1999), 368, 375 and n. 57.

[65] See A. G. Geddes, 'Rags and riches: the costume of Athenian men in the fifth century', *CQ* 37 (1987), 312–13, 323–4, and H. van Wees, 'Greeks Bearing Arms: The State, the Leisure Class, and the Display of Weapons in Archaic Greece', in Fisher and van Wees (n. 64), 349–69; cf., for the Archaic period, E. Stein-Hölkeskamp, *Adelskultur und Polisgesellschaft: Studien zum griechischen Adel in archaischer und klassischer Zeit* (Stuttgart, 1989), 107. In a similar way, however, in the context of a later different value judgement relating to work, similar features of clothing, namely the white garments worn by a handicraftsman in a dream, are decoded as inauspicious omens of unemployment, i.e. of ἀργία or σχολή (see J. Annequin, 'Travail et discours symbolique. La Clé des songes d'Artémidore', in J. Annequin et al. [edd.], *Le travail—Recherches historiques* [Paris, 1999], 47).

[66] For the counter-arguments against the moral supremacy of wealth, see K. J. Dover, *Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle* (Oxford, 1974), 112. Cf., for the late fifth and the fourth century, W. Donlan, *The Aristocratic Ideal and Selected Papers* (Wauconda, 1999^2), 174–6, 178.

[67] *Op.* 311: ἔργον οὐδὲν ὄνειδος, ἀεργίη δέ τ' ὄνειδος; *Apophth.* 4.11 and 15 (= Stob. 3.1.172): ἀνιαρὸν ἀργία; ἀργὸς μὴ ἴσθι, μηδ' ἂν πλουτῇς. For Hesiod, see A. W. H. Adkins, *Moral Values and Political Behaviour in Ancient Greece* (London, 1972), 25, 32–3.

Plato, the occupation of a shepherd, and even of a tyrant or a king (*Tht.* 174d–e)—entail so much ἀσχολία that they oblige their practitioners to abandon all else (6.9). Admittedly, the landowner's activities in the public sphere constitute forms of ἀσχολία in their turn, but thanks to their variety and their nature, they permit a more complete cultivation of the individual and are ultimately to be regarded in a favourable light. At the same time, involvement with the land was never considered degrading in antiquity, in contrast to the mere mechanical arts and trade, which were burdened with connotations connected with the subject's relationship of dependence.[68] At all events, then, as Socratic teaching would require after all,[69] the landowner is not demonstrating in the agora his abstention from work, but rather his freedom to dispose of his time as he wishes, the possession of which freedom, however, he enjoys only briefly, for immediately afterwards he devotes his time to whatever his conscience or his surroundings demand.

Xenophon's formulation here of σχολή is so simple, simplistic even, that there is no need to consider it as a product of the influence of the aristocratic ideal, especially in a society so hostile to the values of aristocratic governance.[70] In the *Memorabilia*, for instance, a group of avaricious people deviate from the example of the landowner and—scorning what the philosophers wish and recommend—greedily use every moment of σχολή simply to increase their profits (2.6.4);[71] and it is precisely this preference of theirs which brings us back to the important question of the correlation between σχολή and wealth and work. The sources rarely deal with this correlation, at least in any explicit, straightforward way. I have already mentioned a passage concerning the prosperous idle imitators of Socrates in connection with his *Apology*. Two more come from Isocrates, who, avoiding any explicit positive evaluation of σχολή, mentions ways of 'consuming' it (1.18: κατανάλισκε τὴν ἐν τῷ βίῳ σχολὴν εἰς τὴν τῶν λόγων φιλοκαλίαν[72]), provided, of course, that it is 'regained' as available time by the individual's being relieved of κίνδυνοι and ἔργα (11.21). Among the ways of consuming σχολή, involvement in public affairs and philosophy is preferred; the possibility of enjoying one's acquisitions is recognized as equally valid, though it is frowned upon. Isocrates is distancing himself from what would follow, if σχολή meant

[68] In this sense for philosophers, in contrast to the ἀνδράποδα, Pl. *Tht.* 175e: ἐν ἐλευθερίᾳ τε καὶ σχολῇ τεθραμμένου. See, for instance, Donlan (n. 66), 172; R. Descat, 'La représentation du travail dans la société grecque', in Annequin et al. (n. 65), 17–18; Mossé (n. 2), 16–18; Meier (n. 4), 94–6; cf. Dover (n. 66), 112, n. 5. For a psychological interpretation of this perception in relation to individual self-sufficiency and personal freedom, see A. Aymard, 'L'idée de travail dans la Grèce archaïque', *Journal de Psychologie* 41 (1948), 38–45, and for the priority of use over production by reason of which artisans are alienated from their products and placed in the service of the end-users, in a relationship of quasi-bondage, J.-P. Vernant, 'Aspects psychologiques du travail dans la Grèce ancienne' [1956], in *Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs* (Paris, 1965), 214, 224–5 (cf. Mossé [n. 2], 47ff.); also, in connection with the phenomenon of slavery, and also the potential to earn political pay or distributions, see S. C. Humphreys, 'Economy and society in classical Athens' [1970], in *Anthropology and the Greeks* (London, 1978), 147–9, n. 38; cf. J. W. Roberts, *City of Sokrates* (London and New York, 1998²), 38–9, 199.

[69] See, mainly, Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.57.

[70] See e.g. M. T. W. Arnheim, *Aristocracy in Greek Society* (London, 1977), 159, 185, and Donlan (n. 66), 173. For the reciprocal relationship between standards of the aristocracy and the values of Hellenic civilisation as a whole, see, in brief, C. G. Starr, *The Aristocratic Temper of Greek Civilization* (New York and Oxford, 1992), 32, 41–2; cf., for the Archaic period, Stein-Hölkeskamp (n. 65), 104.

[71] Cf. in similar contexts, the use of ἄσχολος: Pl. *Leg.* 831c and 832b; for ἀσχολία, see Arist. fr. 56.4.

[72] Cf. Dionys. Com. fr. 4.2: τὴν σχολὴν . . . τοῦ βίου καταχρώμενον.

'leisure': the young followers of his example, equally far removed from the reclusiveness of Ion and the allurements of τερπνὸν κακόν, are equated with slaves (ὥσπερ οἰκέται), and they toil (πονεῖν), they are reduced, that is, to a state of unbearable ἀσχολία[73] but they do prove useful to their city (7.26 and 15.304[74]). We should not regard the fact that it is twice made clear in identical terms that this aim in life is only for those who possess adequate means (βίον ἱκανὸν κεκτημένοι), as is also the case in Plato (*Leg.* 763d: δεῖ δὴ καὶ τούτους δυνατούς τε εἶναι καὶ σχολάζοντας τῶν κοινῶν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι), as a condensation of the profound ideological prejudice against work,[75] but rather as a pragmatic approach to the realities of life: presumably, the δῆμος, in order to 'regain' its σχολή, would have to abandon the ἔργα to which it is already committed, which certainly does not appear to be among Isocrates' intentions; so he simply entrusts δῆμος with appointing the authorities, imposing sanctions, and hearing disputes. Aristotle confirms this impression when he pragmatically accepts that the archons be sought among the upper social strata, owing to their availability because of the σχολή they have acquired (εἰ δὲ δεῖ βλέπειν καὶ πρὸς εὐπορίαν χάριν σχολῆς). He unequivocally rejects the buying and selling of offices, however. Apart from this, even if he tolerates the legislators' indifference towards ensuring the prosperity of those capable of governance, he proposes in any case that the city intervene to guarantee them σχολή, at least for as long as they are in office (*Pol.* 1273a32–b7).

Consequently, like every good, σχολή and the ability σχολάζειν also have a price, which is so high that they are not common property, but not associated enough with other, undesirable social preferences to make those capable of paying a high price resented. Thanks in part to the sponsorship of the city, such a group may occasionally include those who are capable of governing; the same group is more likely to include, however, those who can secure a property which compensates for the loss of income involved in participation in political life or—at a collective level—who have access to an abundance of goods, to defend which, indeed, they labour to cultivate specific accomplishments (*Pol.* 1292b32 and 1334a19).[76] These financial considerations may seem to suggest on an empirical level the distribution of a greater proportion of σχολή among the wealthy and a lesser among the poor;[77] however, this formalization proves much more fragile than is apparent at first glance.

In our modern industrial society the dramatic collapse of the givens of some parameter, such as when improvements in agricultural technology bring about an increase in the coefficient of the productivity of labour, may perhaps mitigate the unequal distribution of spare time between rich and poor. For the Greeks, not only did such a change never take place, but they never considered the theoretical possibility of such a change and its impact upon σχολή. The lack of such reflection may be due to the insufficient methods of economic analysis employed by the Greeks. However, were any such redistribution of, or increase in, σχολή ever to have taken place among the different social strata of Greek society, qualitative criteria might have emerged, to readjust the comparative value of σχολή among social strata. For example, the low

[73] As, moreover, were the Egyptian priests who were exempted from ἔργα in order to devote themselves to medicine (11.21).

[74] Cf. the ἀσχολία of those who covet splendid sporting victories in Pl. *Leg.* 807c.

[75] See Mossé (n. 2), 45.

[76] Cf. 1293a18, 1300a3, 1318b12.

[77] See *Pol.* 1273a25, 33; 1291b26; 1292b28, 36; 1326b31; cf. Stocks (n. 32), 179–80, 182. Solmsen (n. 8), 218, n. 98, quite rightly fails to recognize in these statements traces of the rationalization of some sort of 'political, economic or class prejudice'.

regard in which manual labourers were held by higher levels of society may have led the upper social strata, at least, to devalue the quality of a labourer's σχολή, in comparison with their own, which they could employ to pursue accomplishments which they prided themselves on exclusively possessing. We do know a couple of imaginary occasions in which σχολή in itself would have been deprived of any social and political connotations: firstly, during the reign of Cronos, that is, the 'Golden generation', all people live in full happiness, free from toil, due to the abundant self-sown fruits of the earth (Hes. *Op.* 109ff.). Secondly, in the comic Utopia of Aristophanes abundant wealth leads everyone to complete abstention from labour and then to unconcern for the profits of the slave-trade. In the end, all citizens end up working as hard as slaves, merely in order to meet their everyday needs (*Eccl.* 510ff.). In the first case, the blessed people of the time of Cronos had not yet tasted of bitter social inequality; in the second case, despite the universal gift of wealth and leisure, we are not allowed to suggest that all fundamental differences between social strata, such as moral values, social prejudices and lust for power, would have been eradicated. Such a paradoxical outcome, that, despite having abundant leisure, the poor cannot be regarded on the same level as the rich, is neatly expressed by Paul Veyne's penetrating distinction, between disdain for manual labour *per se* and the deliberate highlighting of the inferiority of the lower strata from which manual labourers came: 'on les accuse de travailler pour les noyer dans un mépris de classe: on ne les méprise pas parce qu'ils travaillent'.[78]

On the other hand, the citizens of the upper social strata, or, at least, the wealthiest of them, whether or not they proved worthy of, or willing to meet, Isocrates' expectations, devoted their time to looking after their household in a more or less systematic way, a task that can be extremely onerous.[79] Xenophon himself highlights this negative aspect of wealth in an extreme and striking way, when the very engaging Pheraulas gives his very considerable fortune to a Sacian guest of his, having first bemoaned in tragic tones the tribulations of the ἀσχολία required to keep it up. Pheraulas muses, not without pride, upon his humble origins and the hard manual labour with which he supported his father, and, enjoying great affluence now but sighing for the insouciance of his impoverished past, he is interested only in regaining his σχολή by repudiating all material possessions so that he can devote himself to his friends (*Cyr.* 8.3.35–50).[80] Pheraulas' example is indeed a weak one to reveal any

[78] P. Veyne in P. Veyne (ed.), *Histoire de la vie privée. De l'Empire romain à l'an mil* (= P. Ariès and G. Duby (edd.), *Histoire de la vie privée* 1 [Paris, 1985], 116, 120, 130).

[79] See, for instance, Balme (n. 4), 145–6. For the impact of Ischomachus' views on the political body as a whole, and for their lasting relevance, see A. Burford, *Land and Labor in the Greek World* (Baltimore and London, 1993), 82–9, 223–30. The distinction between the richest and the poorest farmers, thanks to which Ischomachus' concern for the household is characterized by freedom of choice and, consequently, of leisure (Johnstone [n. 2], 229, n. 59, 231–2), and the differentiation between the landowners and those—freemen or slaves—who genuinely invested their manual labour in the land (see, for instance, the elevation of this criterion in Bradford Welles [n. 2], 8–11) sometimes seem misleading with regard to work, in that they do very little to enlighten us as to whether the former perceived the supervising of their estate as non-work, whatever that might mean in the absence of a coherent term for it, as was pointed out by J.-P. Vernant, 'Travail et nature dans la Grèce ancienne' [1955], in *Mythe et pensée* . . . (n. 68), 197–9; cf. Veyne (n. 78), 121ff.; cf. Dover (n. 66) ('possibly wealthy Greeks considered that they themselves worked very hard'), and also the parallel of Roman land ownership in W. Fitzgerald, 'Labor and laborer in Latin poetry: the case of the *Moretum*', *Arethusa* 29 (1996), 391–4; cf. W. Stroh, 'Labor improbus: Die Arbeit im antiken Rom', in Schubert (n. 4), 119–20.

[80] Cf. a similar relationship, for securing σχολή, between the master and the administrator of a house in [Arist.] *Mag. Mor.* 1.34.31–2.

ascetic contempt of wealth on Xenophon's part, who was himself an authority on how to possess and keep it; but if we compare this example with that of king Cyrus' (*Cyr.* 8.1.12–16), which we have already mentioned, it becomes obvious that rich and mighty people do not enjoy σχολή in a self-evident way and, indeed, sometimes strive to gain it at the expense of their interests or duties. Consequently, for Xenophon, who attempts elsewhere a definition of σχολή, and his society, an apparently obvious statement like 'wealth and power bring leisure' would perhaps seem simplistic, if not naïve.

In this respect, the exclusivity of the privilege to enjoy σχολή, which the rich have, may be regarded among the Greeks as merely potential, or may even be totally disputed. With reference to the fourth type of democracy, Aristotle asserts that, owing to jury and assembly pay, the poor have more σχολή (σχολάζειν) than the rich, who, probably because they are looking after their personal fortune, frequently avoid the assembly and the law-courts (*Pol.* 1293a1–9).[81] Although the validity of this assertion may be challenged,[82] the current and general sense of the term σχολή among the classical Greeks does not allow us to conceive of two separate, impenetrable social worlds, composed of upper and lower social strata respectively, of which only the former enjoys leisure and only the latter is engaged in work. This is the case, despite the capacity for so-called 'soft escapism' among upper strata, that is, their tendency to withdraw into private life and refocus their interest on leisure activities and pleasure, such as sexual activity, luxury, and sport.[83] Furthermore, to return to the idealization of σχολή, our doubt as to whether it eradicated or supplanted the meaning of the word in its contemporary current use, as roughly outlined above, would seem justified: in Demosthenes' speeches, and the probably spurious fourth Philippic, delivered before the Athenian ecclesia, σχολή is associated with μηδὲν ποιεῖν, with ῥᾳστώνη, and, disparagingly, with ἡσυχία (8.53, [10].54, 18.45). If we examine the orators, who are for their own good bound to keep pace with the intuition of a large audience of common people, we find a significantly limited use of σχολή and its derivatives and indeed only in their most current meanings. In addition to these negative, or at least neutral, overtones of σχολή in Demosthenes' quotations, we have already examined Isocrates' usage. In Andocides, Aeschines, and Antiphon σχολή, σχολῇ, ἀσχολία, and σχολάζω occur only sporadically.[84] Although we should not press this point too far, comparison with philosophers leads us to conclude that their favourite contemplative dimension of the concept was not incorporated into rhetorical vocabulary. Most important of all, in rhetorical praise or criticism of the democratic constitution, the actual word σχολή seems never to be a crucial feature of public life.

More generally, Aristotle uses the verb σχολάζειν five times in his account of various constitutions, exclusively in connection with the variants of democracy, and once in his account of the types of δῆμος. There can be no doubt that σχολάζειν is

[81] Cf., for misers and avaricious citizens, Pl. *Leg.* 831c.

[82] See R. K. Sinclair, *Democracy and Participation in Athens* (Cambridge, 1988), 120–2; but cf. also the persuasive arguments of M. M. Markle, 'Jury pay and assembly pay at Athens', in P. Cartledge and F. D. Harvey (edd.), *Crux: Essays in Greek History Presented to G. E. M. de Ste. Croix on his 75th Birthday* (London, 1985), 267ff. and, especially, 273. At all events, in a similar context, Plato—exaggerating with regard to the real value of μισθός—chooses, instead of the group of derivatives of σχολή, the adjective ἀργός: *Περικλέα πεποιηκέναι Ἀθηναίους ἀργοὺς καὶ δειλοὺς καὶ λάλους καὶ φιλαργύρους* (*Grg.* 515e).

[83] See J. M. Bryant, *Moral Codes and Social Structure in Ancient Greece. A Sociology of Greek Ethics from Homer to the Epicureans and Stoics* (New York, 1996), 109–10.

[84] See, above, nn. 21, 25, 47 and 53.

correlated with the establishment of democracy in that the latter presupposes participation (*μετέχειν*). Consequently, differing responses on the part of different social strata to the demands of a proverbially time-consuming system of governing and of dispensing justice that required considerable manpower were matters of great importance;[85] but in the context of political rivalry the lack of *σχολάζειν* could also establish humiliating arguments that marginalized certain individuals or groups.[86] In work we can easily recognize a significant rival to this participation in politics and, as we saw above, in the case of the rich, in a wider context the issue essentially concerns the rivalry between private and public affairs. Correspondingly, in *σχολή* we recognize an irreplaceable basis for participation, in other words the factor of time in its 'political' aspect. Exactly the same applies to dialogue, in connection with which Plato so often refers to *σχολή*; but much more so to the 'luxury' of intellectual culture, since, for instance, mythology and investigation of the past, as Critias explains to Hermocrates, appeared in the cities simultaneously with *σχολή* (*μετὰ σχολῆς ἅμα*), when it was certain that people had sufficient necessities of life to survive (*Criti.* 110a); and precisely the same thought is implicit in the pride of the Athenian who, in connection with his city's festivals, sacrifices, and games, defends its superiority in terms of free time (*περὶ χρόνου σχολῆς*) and also of its abundance of life's necessities (*Leg.* 828d).[87]

However, despite all these significant aspects of *σχολή*, it seems that in real political life other factors and criteria frequently prevailed: no sources, for example, interpret Agyrrhius' introduction of assembly pay in terms of *σχολή*, Aristophanes contents himself with mocking the citizens who attend simply to receive the payment (*Eccl.* 184), Demosthenes praises the demagogue solely on the ground of defending popular interests (24.134) and, above all, Aristotle intends his proposals to be a simple device to secure attendance by the multitude (*Ath. Pol.* 41.3). In all three cases, it was not work but a kind of apathy or a sense of futility that previously—when not paid for—prevented the Athenians attending the assembly. Thus, the antithesis between work and *σχολή*, when considered theoretically as one among several prerequisites for democratic participation, does not, as is frequently pointed out, amount to a head-on collision; and, beyond politics, it is based much less on disdain for work than on the need for some freedom to dispose of one's time, despite all the imperative necessities which overwhelm finite human time.

Further, the idealization of *σχολή* could symmetrically be understood as an answer, albeit Utopian, to the impasses created by the finite nature of time rather than as the culmination of the polemic against work, even if that answer provocatively and unilaterally favoured or flattered specific social strata. In any case, if we avoid exaggerated interpretations, only a few arguments, and the most commonplace ones at that, about social inequality, for at least the fifth- and the fourth-century society, can be substantiated solely on the ground of idealized *σχολή*. Moreover, we cannot

[85] For the special importance of the criterion of leisure for the lower strata, see, mainly, Markle (n. 82), 269–71; more generally, see T. Morawetz, *Der Demos als Tyrann und Banause* (Frankfurt am Main, 2000), 22ff. Thus, even in the planning of the ideal constitution, next to the cultivation of virtue the possibility of participation is given prominence in order to exclude mechanics, shopkeepers, and farmers from governance: *δεῖ γὰρ σχολῆς καὶ πρὸς τὴν γένεσιν τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ πρὸς τὰς πράξεις τὰς πολιτικάς* (Arist. *Pol.* 1329a1–2).

[86] See, e.g. for Cleon the tanner, Adkins (n. 67), 140–1, and Donlan (n. 66), 173. More generally, for a correlation between disdain for manual labour and disdain for radical democracy, see Meier (n. 4), 81–92.

[87] For the same *topos* regarding to the primacy of survival over cultivation of the mind, cf. Arist. *Top.* 118a10–1, fr. 53.10–14, and, of course, *Metaph.* 982b11–28.

attribute to σχολή the notion of 'conspicuous leisure', that is, a conception of leisure that aggressively despises work, because no such trace of 'conspicuousness' is to be found in any comments on σχολή: philosophers attempted to transform 'soft escapism' into contemplation, but contemplation was never meant to be a *manière*, provocatively conspicuous, and no source makes any allusion to social motives of σχολή or to how it may somehow inspire awe or ward off envy or mockery. Therefore, social superiority could be made clear, if the upper strata's moral, intellectual and political merit was publicly unchallenged, and they could make it come true by prudently taking advantage of their non-work or, more precisely, 'possession of time'.

In the years that followed the Aristotelian treatment of it, if σχολή defined an ideal means of escape from the tyranny of necessity or a defence against it, this was due mainly to the oppressive sense of loss or insidious waste of time that developed out of the increasingly negative connotations of ἀσχολία, as is reflected, not without some chagrin, in the Epicurean maxim ὁ δὲ βίος μελλησμῷ παραπόλλυται καὶ εἷς ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ἀσχολούμενος ἀποθνήσκει (*Sent. Vat.* 14.3–4 Arrighetti; cf. 109.2 and 8). Later on, the Cynics, the Stoics, and, above all, Christianity ennobled work,[88] and this relief from the distress of ἀσχολία was welcomed, though it was not to last forever.[89]

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[88] See, for instance, G. Ovitt, Jr, 'The cultural context of western technology: early Christian attitudes toward manual labor', *T&C* 27 (1986), 487ff. Cf., however, turning to Stoic literature, van den Hoven (n. 36), 31–63, who points out the positive attitude of the sources to the mechanical arts themselves, but not, however, to their practitioners.

[89] I wish to thank the editor, Professor Chris Collard, and the anonymous referee of *CQ* for their many constructive criticisms and suggestions.